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“Language may be a distorting mirror, but it is the only mirror we have”1  
 
         Abstract 
The core presumption of object oriented ontology and other speculative realisms is that we have 
epistemic access to the absolute – which seems to be a rather weird place looking at the systems 
these ontologists propose. One of the best cases for said presumption is found in Meillassoux’s 
After Finitude. He aims to secure our access to reality as it is in itself by refuting correlationism 
according to which we cannot escape reality as it is thought by us. He presents three arguments: 
ancestrality, facticity and mathematization. On the first argument correlationism fails because 
it cannot render scientific statements about an universe anterior to us meaningful. I address the 
worry that he might not take this to be a real argument against correlationism and argue that it 
in any case fails. On the second argument correlationism is flawed since it remains committed 
to absolute possibilities. I argue that this argument is untenable as well. On his third argument 
correlationism fails because science reveals a mathematically describable reality indifferent to 
our existence. I argue that the almost perfect mathematization of nature can actually be cashed 
out as an argument for correlationism. I conclude by proposing an alternative way of showing 
that mathematics is the language of the absolute understood as a radical contingent hyperchaos. 
Keywords: Epistemology, Correlationism, Object oriented ontology, Speculative realism 
1. Introduction 
Object oriented ontology as founded by Graham Harman and further developed by Levi Bryant, 
Timothy Morton and Ian Bogost, and also closely related instances of speculative realism such 
as the realisms of Ray Brassier and Iain Grant, all share a number of philosophical convictions. 
Without doubt the most important of these shared convictions is the core presumption that we 
 
1 Dummett 1993, 6. 
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have direct access to mind independent reality. We are able to gain knowledge of the absolute. 
This premise is nothing less than a necessary condition for the very possibility of object oriented 
ontology and other speculative realisms. But why would anyone accept it? A particular strong 
case for the core presumption of speculative realism is found in Meillassoux’s After Finitude.2  
Meillassoux is often considered as the one that warranted speculative realism by demonstrating 
that we have direct access to the world as it is in itself. If he really did liberate us from the prison 
of human relativity and hence from the privilege of the human relationship to reality over other 
relationships, then Meillassoux is rightly seen as one of the main founding fathers of speculative 
realism. For all speculative realisms maintain that the human subject and its perspective are not 
special at all. For example, on object oriented ontology human subjects are just objects among 
all other kinds of objects. All entities and their relations are placed on equal ontological footing. 
After finally having been freed from the limited privileged human relation to the world  – after 
having escaped reality as conditioned by us, object oriented philosophers and other speculative 
realists claim to have discovered how uncommon and weird ‘the great outdoors’ really is.  
That’s why speculative realism is often aptly referred to as “weird” realism by Graham Harman 
and other speculative realists.3 They found out that reality as it is not projected by us is actually 
a very strange and curious place. Harman has it that the world is a mixture of objects that forever 
withdraw from each other and interact indirectly via ‘vicarious causation’.4 On Ray Brassier’s 
reductive eliminativism absolute reality is ultimately nothing more than a nihilistic meaningless 
void, on Levi Bryant’s object oriented ontology called “onticology” reality consists of dynamic 
differences producing objects themselves wholly composed of differences, and for Meillassoux 
the absolute is necessarily a radically contingent cartesian hyperchaos.5 Strange systems indeed. 
But again, is the core presumption on which object oriented ontology and other realisms depend 
sufficiently justified? Did Meillassoux’s attempt succeed? Did he liberate us from the prison of 
human privileged anti-absolutism? Is his demonstration of realism convincing? Let’s find out. 
In After Finitude Meillassoux strives to regain access to the absolute, that is, to how the world 
is in itself rather than how it is experienced and thought by us. His main opponent thus is post-
 
2 Meillassoux 2008 – hereafter ‘Meillassoux’. 
3 Harman 2018. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Brassier 2007, Harman 2018.  
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Kantian critical philosophy, which is premised on the thesis that what we call ‘reality’ appears 
inescapably as the correlate of our language or thought. Post-critical Kantians subordinate our 
knowledge of the “great outdoors” to our epistemic relation with it. Since it is impossible for 
us to step outside our human cognitive capacities, we will never be able to access reality as it 
is independently from us. We will never be able to know anything about the nature of the 
absolute. Philosophers within the post-critical phenomenological and existential tradition hence 
turned away from absolute reality. They focused on language, consciousness or some other 
suggested realm of the ‘for us’ and not on how being is independently from us. For them any 
post-critical attempt to regain access to the ‘in itself’ is discarded as pre-critical and even naive. 
Yet, Meillassoux is not returning to a pre-critical stance. He purports to think reality in itself 
again, but without going back to pre-critical thought. His aim is to show that post-Kantian 
correlationism, the idea that we as human beings have only access to the correlation or interplay 
between thinking and being, and never to being itself, is untenable. For that he provides three 
arguments against correlationism in his book. The argument from ancestrality purports to show 
that correlationism fails because it cannot render scientific statements about a world anterior to 
our relationship to the world meaningful. His argument from facticity aims to establish that 
correlationism is incoherent, since it remains committed to absolute possibilities. His argument 
from mathematization intends to conclude that correlationism must be rejected because modern 
science has revealed a mathematically describable physical world that is totally independent of 
human existence. In this article I present and analyze these three arguments, and argue they all 
fail. Thus, despite Meillassoux’s original attempt to break the post-Kantian correlationist circle, 
to escape from prison, he did not regain access to the absolute. We remain in the ‘for us’. 
In the next section I outline in more detail the position Meillassoux wants to overcome, namely 
correlationism. In section 3 I present his argument from ancestrality against correlationism. I’ll 
also discuss the preliminary question of whether he takes ancestrality to be an argument against 
correlationism at all – and if so, how strong he takes this argument to be. In section 4 I argue 
that his appeal to ancestrality is actually based on a false dilemma and therefore not convincing. 
In section 5 I describe his argument from facticity. I argue that this argument does not succeed 
either due to a confusion between epistemic and ontological possibilities. In section 6 I discuss 
his third argument, namely the argument from the almost perfect mathematization of the world. 
I argue that, contrary to Meillassoux, the apparent exhaustive mathematization of reality can in 




In his book Meillassoux provides a detailed account of the post-Kantian position that he wants 
to reject. He has coined the view correlationism. Its central concept is the correlation, that is to 
say, the correlation between thought and being. According to correlationism “we only ever have 
access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart 
from the other.”6 Its main thesis is that human experience and thought cannot get outside itself 
in order to compare the world as it is ‘in itself’ to the world as it is ‘for us’. We simply cannot 
establish which aspects of reality are independent from our cognitive faculties and which are a 
function of our cognitive relation to the world. All we as human beings can ever apprehend are 
correlates. We are always and already situated “in the midst of the correlation.”7 
Correlationism departs from the epistemic primacy of the correlation, that is to say, of the 
relation between thought and world, over the related terms. Says Meillassoux:  
“The ‘co-’ (of co-givenness, of co-relation, of the co-originary, of co-presence, etc.) is 
the grammatical particle that dominates modern philosophy, its veritable ‘chemical 
formula’. Thus, one could say that up until Kant, one of the principal problems of 
philosophy was to think substance, while ever since Kant, it has consisted in trying to 
think the correlation. […] [T]o ask who has grasped the more originary correlation: is it 
the thinker of the subject-object correlation, the noetico-noematic correlation, or the 
language-referent correlation? The question is no longer ‘which is the proper substrate?’ 
but ‘which is the proper correlate?’ During the twentieth century, the two principal 
‘media’ of the correlation were consciousness and language, the former bearing 
phenomenology, the latter the various currents of analytic philosophy.”8 
The correlation of thought and being is thus not necessarily the same as the relation between 
subject and object. Many post-Kantians hold that the correlation is of a more original, 
fundamental or inclusive nature. The inescapable epistemic togetherness of thinking and being 
is akin to a wide range of post-critical positions within continental and analytical philosophy, 
 
6 Meillassoux, 5. 
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including, say, Heidegger’s Dasein and Ereignis as the co-propriation of man and being and 
Carnap’s dismissal of cognitive external questions.  
Further, as Meillassoux points out, 
“correlationism is not a metaphysics: it does not hypostatize the correlation; rather, it 
invokes the correlation to curb every hypostatization, every substantialization of an 
object of knowledge which would turn the latter into a being existing in and of itself. To 
say that we cannot extricate ourselves from the horizon of correlation is not to say that 
the correlation could exist by itself, independently of its incarnation in individuals.”9    
He articulates the point of correlationism very aptly when he writes:  
“Consider [this scientific] statement: ‘Event Y occurred x number of years before the 
emergence of humans’. The correlationist philosopher will in no way intervene in the 
content of this statement: she will not contest the claim […]. No – she will simply add 
[to this statement] – something like a simple codicil, always the same one, which she 
will […] append to the end of the phrase: ‘Event Y occurred x number of years before 
the emergence of humans – for humans […].’ This codicil is the codicil of modernity.”10 
Thus, precisely because we cannot get beyond or step out of our human condition, everything 
we say, experience or think is always already relative to us. This prior ‘for us’ is inescapable. 
The absolute “great outdoors” of pre-critical philosophy is inaccessible. We will never reach 
out to reality as it is not relative to us, as it exists in itself regardless of thought.   
Before I continue a remark is appropriate. When I read Meillassoux’s book in which he presents 
correlationism I was astonished. Here was suddenly someone of whom I had never heard, from 
a tradition of philosophy that is not really mine, but who had nevertheless before me identified 
and described the very same position that I had developed and argued for in my master thesis.11 
And in fact, he not only formulated it, he even tried to refute it. Moreover, he found this catchy 
name correlationism for it. Still, I think that the concept of correlation is not adequate to sketch 
the position. For it still seems to assume too much. If access to the ‘in itself’ is impossible for 
us, then we cannot know either that we are trapped in a correlation between our thought and 
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being. For on correlationism, for all we know, consciousness might be all there is. It might be 
true in an absolute sense that only mind exists. In that case it would not be appropriate to speak 
of a co-relation. There would be in fact a sort of mental monism instead of a correlation between 
thinking and being. Since the correlationist cannot rule out such an absolute idealism, the term 
‘correlation’ assumes in fact too much. 
In what follows I will flesh out the theory of knowledge that Meillassoux so creatively coined 
correlationism and I named so dully ‘the alternative theory of knowledge’ in my master thesis 
and thereafter a bit less dully “the-world-for-us epistemology”. Given that as earlier mentioned 
the concept “correlation” has the conceptual difficulty of excluding mental monism, I take the 
freedom to describe the position as I did independently from Meillassoux in my master thesis. 
However, what I say about it accords with Meillassoux’s characterization of correlationism. 
The constitutive distinction of correlationism is the distinction between the-world-for-us and 
the-world-in-itself. The-world-for-us is the world as implied by the human point of view. It is 
the world as thought and perceived by us humans. The-world-in-itself is the world as it exists 
in and for itself in an absolute sense. It is the absolute. 
The-world-in-itself is inaccessible for us. It is impossible for us to get outside ourselves in order 
to compare the world as it is ‘in itself’ to the world as it is ‘for us’. We do not have access to 
such an absolute stance since we cannot have knowledge of anything independent of our human 
way of thinking and perceiving. We are trapped in our human condition. We can only access 
the world from our human viewpoint. In other words, we cannot think or perceive something 
while abstracting from the fact that it is still us who are thinking or perceiving it. Indeed, if we 
think or perceive anything as true about the in-itself, then what we think or perceive is still a 
human thought or human experience. All our knowledge is inescapably qualified as human 
knowledge. And we cannot get rid of this qualification. Thus a “view from nowhere” is for us 
unreachable. Absolute knowledge is therefore unobtainable. The-world-in-itself is unknowable 
because our knowledge is always inevitably relative to our human conditions of knowledge. 
Is this then Kantianism or transcendental idealism? Surely not, for contrary to Kantianism or 
transcendental idealism, even the metaphysical claim that there are things outside us grounding 
our experience, can only be justified as a statement about the-world-for-us. So, Kant’s dictum 
that there are Dinge-an-sich or objects that ground our human experience is only warranted as 
a claim within the-world-for-us. Kant took his famous distinction between the noumenal world 
and the phenomenal world as an absolute. But contrary to Kantianism, we do not know whether 
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this distinction is absolutely true. On correlationism it is nothing more than a claim about the-
world-for-us and not about the-world-in-itself. Indeed, Kant’s dictum is a distinction within the-
world-for-us. Moreover, even the utterly fundamental distinction between the-world-for-us and 
the-world-in-itself is ultimately only justified as an assertion about how the world is for us. For 
again, really everything we think and say applies to the-world-for-us. Contrary to transcendental 
idealism, the-world-for-us is the ultimate unsurpassable horizon of all our human experience 
and thought. It is for us the holistic all-inclusive. We are always already in it. The-world-for-
us is the subject of all our predications, even those that distinguish it from the-world-in-itself. 
Is then the-world-for-us epistemology a form of metaphysical or speculative idealism? No, it is 
not. Metaphysical or speculative idealism claims to know the-world-in-itself. On metaphysical 
or speculative idealism the ‘in-itself’ is consciousness or mind and nothing exists outside it. But 
this claim cannot be warranted because we cannot know the in-itself. Is it then realism? No, for 
again we know nothing at all about the in-itself; and therefore also not whether realism is true. 
Now, let us draw a map. According to realism there are minds and mind-independent objects. 
Minds can know these objects. Kantianism or transcendental idealism also has it that there are 
minds and mind-independent objects. But these minds cannot know these objects. Further, 
metaphysical or speculative idealism asserts that there are only minds. All objects are mind-
dependent constructions and known to be such. According to yet another position, let’s call it 
the epistemic stance, there are minds. But we cannot get outside our minds. So we do not know 
whether there are mind-independent objects. And if there are objects outside us, we do not know 
whether they are similar to what is grasped by our minds, or quite different. 
On this map correlationism is yet another position. On correlationism or the meta-epistemic 
stance all distinctions, even those between ‘mind’ and ‘mind-independent object’, between ‘the 
inside’ and ‘the outside’, between ‘subject’ and ‘object’, between ‘experience’ and ‘that what 
grounds experience’ are only justified as human-relative distinctions. Distinctions such as those 
between ‘minds’ and ‘mind-independent objects’, between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and between 
‘subject’ and ‘object’ might not apply to the in-itself. Because of the inescapable inaccessibility 
of the-world-in-itself we will never know. For everything we say can only be justified as a claim 
about the-world-for-us. As said, even the very distinction between the-world-for-us and the-
world-in-itself is merely justified within the-world-for-us from which we simply cannot escape. 
Now, should all this worry metaphysicians? Not at all. Contrary to Meillassoux I do accept 
correlationism. In fact, I believe that it is precisely correlationism that enables us to justifiably 
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do metaphysics after Kant. Let me explain why. Within the-world-for-us we can justify many, 
many claims. Examples include, but are not limited to, logical propositions such as the principle 
of modus ponens, non-contradiction and truth-bivalence, mathematical statements such as the 
theorems of set theory, ordinary claims (such as that I exist, or that Liza exists instead of being 
merely a product of my thought; that the glass of water in front of me exists extra-mentally as 
well, that Paris is the capital of France, etc.), and moral claims, such as that it is wrong to torture 
people for fun. In fact, even the whole project of metaphysics can be carried out entirely within 
the-world-for-us, as long as we fully realize that all our metaphysical claims, similar to all other 
claims we do, are about the-world-for-us and can never be justified as claims about the in-itself.  
Realists who are unable to refute correlationism often merely aim to disqualify it by resorting 
to what Meillassoux calls the ‘Rhetoric of the Rich Elsewhere’: “[L]et’s leave the fortress as it 
is, and let’s explore the world in all its vastness! […] There are so many interesting realities to 
investigate! [...] Let’s stop discussing, and let’s open the windows: let’s inhale things and feel 
the breeze!”12 But this rhetoric fails since it equally applies to the-world-for-us. All our projects 
– even the whole project of metaphysics – can be properly carried out within the for-us. We can 
do our metaphysics and discover many interesting things and facts inside the-world-for-us. Here 
we arrive at a valid metaphysics-for-us. Such a metaphysics is in fact quite powerful since many 
fruitful classical metaphysical principles can be justified as principles about the-world-for-us.  
For example, contrary to what Meillassoux seems to believe, embracing “sceptico-fideism” is 
not the only way for religious believers to find support in correlationism.13 For metaphysically 
inclined theists may aim for “a return of the religious” by purporting to develop their onto- or 
natural theology within the context of the-world-for-us, so as to arrive at, say, a God-for-us.  
In any case we can explore the full richness of all objects, relations and structures in the for-us. 
And this is sufficient. For what else could we as human beings wish for than to justify claims 
about how the world is for us? Indeed, what else could we as human beings wish for than to be 
justified as human beings? After all, we are human beings, not gods. The in-itself is and remains 
inaccessible. That is what we should concede to the radical skeptic. But we can still find truth: 
objective universal truth within the-world-for-us. And for us humans, that should be sufficient. 
 
12 Brassier, Grant, Harman, & Meillassoux (hereafter “Speculative Realism”) 2007, 423. 
13 Meillassoux, 43-9. 
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     3.  The ancestral challenge 
In After Finitude’s first chapter Meillassoux presents his first argument against correlationism. 
He calls it the argument from ancestrality. It is not entirely clear how strong Meillassoux takes 
this argument to be. More specifically, is the argument an attempt to refute correlationism? That 
is to say, is the argument intended to be a fatal objection against it? It’s not even clear whether 
he considers it to be an argument against correlationism. The problem of ancestrality may only 
be a way “to awaken us from our correlationist slumber, by enjoining us to reconcile thought 
and absolute.”14 This interpretation is supported by what Meillassoux says during the Q&A of 
his lecture at ‘Speculative Realism: A One-Day Workshop’ that took place in April 2007 at the 
University of London – a workshop that brought together the at the time “four horsemen” of 
“weird” or speculative realism: Ray Brassier, Iain Grant, Graham Harman, and Meillassoux: 
“In After Finitude I try to persuade the reader with what I call ‘the problem of the arche-
fossil’. The problem of the arche-fossil was for me a way to write in a context principally 
dominated by correlationist philosophy. So I tried to show the correlationist reader – 
probably a correlationist – that there could be a problem in correlationism. The whole 
first chapter is saying: maybe there is a problem with this metaphysics … And I just 
demonstrate the problem like that.”15 
So ancestrality seems not really an argument against correlationism. It doesn’t refute it. At most 
it results in a situation of parity between correlationism and realism, thus arriving at an aporia. 
This fits nicely with the fact that, as is quite obvious from After Finitude and the aforementioned 
lecture, he takes correlationism to be a highly respectful and very strong position that cannot be 
so easily refuted. Indeed, says Meillassoux: “By the term ‘correlation’, I also wanted to exhibit 
the essential argument of these ‘philosophies of access’, as Harman calls them; and – I insist 
on this point – the exceptional strength of this argumentation, apparently and desperately 
implacable.”16 Thus, for example, François Laruelle’s alleged refutation of the circle – on which 
Ray Brassier relies in Nihil Unbound to reject correlationism – doesn’t convince him at all. By 
appealing to a quite strong Fichtean version of correlationism he shows that François Laruelle’s 
 
14 Ibid., 128. 
15 Speculative Realism, 438-9. 
16 Ibid., 409. 
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argument against correlationism is untenable.17 It’s merely a disqualifying coup de force that 
doesn’t refute it. It doesn’t break the circle. That’s why in the last part of his lecture Meillassoux 
says: “This necessity of a second argument is extremely important, since, as we shall see, it will 
become the flaw of the circle-fortress. This second argument, as I claimed in After Finitude, is 
the argument of facticity.”18 So he sees invoking ancestrality as insufficient to escape the circle. 
On the other hand Meillassoux is quite clear in After Finitude that the arche-fossil or ancestrality 
presents a challenge, difficulty, paradox, and problem for correlationism.19 How correlationists 
interpret or propose to account for ancestrality is deemed insupportable.20 Meillassoux indeed 
refers to the problem of ancestrality as an argument or objection to which the anti-absolutistic 
opponent must respond.21 And the argument from the ancestral is moreover considered valid.22  
Meillassoux ultimately holds that the correlationist does not prevail dialectically in light of the 
arche-fossil.23 He even concludes at the very end of the first chapter of After Finitude that the 
correlationist circle is irremediably incompatible with ancestrality.24 It thus still seems that the 
argument from ancestrality refutes correlationism according to Meillasoux. So he actually takes 
it to be a very powerful argument that results in a fatal objection to correlationism. That’s why 
“weird” realists such as Graham Harman adequately point out that Meillassoux’s “appeal to an 
“ancestral” realm prior to all human access succeeds in defining an unexpected new battlefield 
for continental thought.”25 A battlefield moreover that threatens the circle.26 Meillassoux takes 
it that “by reducing ancestral reality to reality-for-us, correlationism fails to do it justice.”27 It 
 
17 Ibid., 418-21. 
18 Ibid., 428. 
19 Meillassoux, 11, 21, 22, 23, 26. 
20 Ibid., 16. 
21 Ibid., 18, 19, 22.   
22 Ibid., 22.  
23 Ibid., 24. 
24 Ibid., 27. 
25 Harman 2007, 104. 
26 Ibid., 107. 
27 Ibid., 109. 
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is with this that Harman agrees when he asserts: “[…] we know through his brilliant argument 
at the beginning of his book that there must be an ancestral realm outside of knowledge.”28      
So let’s consider and confront the challenge of the arche-fossil as a rebutting argument against 
correlationism and explore its dialectical strength. In what follows I describe the argument as 
Meillassoux presents it. After that I provide my maximally charitable version of the argument, 
which I take to be its strongest version. This version is still inspired by what Meillassous writes. 
I shall then argue that the argument, even at a high point of rigor, and although ingenious, fails. 
Meillassoux starts his outline of the argument with the observation that contemporary science 
has established beyond reasonable doubt that the cosmos is older than the advent of human life. 
There have been many events anterior to the coming into being of human beings, such as the 
origin of the universe itself (13.8 billion years ago), the accretion of the earth (4.6 billion years 
ago) and the extinction of the dinosaurs (66 million years ago). Meillassoux calls events that 
took place before the advent of human life ancestral. Now, anyone who takes science seriously 
must accept that ancestral events took place. This is undeniable. Time, space and matter clearly 
did exist before there were human beings. The history of the cosmos is much older than that of 
human life. Meillassoux then asks the following question:  
“How are we to grasp the meaning of scientific statements bearing explicitly upon a 
manifestation of the world that is posited as anterior to the emergence of thought and 
even of life – posited, that is, as anterior to every form of human relation to the world? 
Or, to put it more precisely: how are we to think the meaning of a discourse which 
construes the relation to the world – that of thinking and/or living – as a fact inscribed 
in a temporality within which this relation is just one event among others, inscribed in 
an order of succession in which it is merely a stage, rather than an origin?”29 
So, given that the ancestral statements of contemporary science are in fact indisputable, how is 
correlationism able to accept these statements? Ancestral claims clearly impose no problem for 
realism. For the realist it is no surprise that the world we experience existed a long time before 
we came into being. After all, he or she takes it that the world we experience is the world as it 
exists in itself independently from us. But scientific ancestral statements do pose a problem for 
 
28 Speculative realism, 387. 
29 Meillassoux, 10. 
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the correlationist. Or so Meillassoux thinks. Here is why. If science tells us that the correlate 
emerged in the world, how can correlationists then maintain that it is the givenness of the world? 
The only option for the correlationist seems to be to interpret ancestral statements in a specific 
way. Yes, the universe originated 13.8 billion years ago, before the advent of human beings. 
But this claim is justified only as a claim about how the world is for us. It doesn’t say anything 
about the world ‘in itself’. And yes, science teaches that the earth came into being 4.6 billion 
years ago. But again, this undeniable fact is only a fact for us. Whether it is true of the world in 
itself remains wholly unknown for us. Here we see how correlationists invoke the ‘codicil of 
modernity’ to move from a common ‘face-value’ realist meaning of ancestral statements to the 
more originary correlationist meaning. The reason for this crucial move is that on correlationism 
the face-value realist meaning of ancestral statements cannot be the ultimate meaning. For that 
would entail that we have gained access to a being that is not co-extensive with our relation to 
it, that is, a being anterior to the correlate. But such access is impossible on correlationism.  
Yet, as Meillassoux continues to argue, this strategy of shifting towards an alleged deeper or 
more fundamental meaning by invoking the ‘for us’ codicil does not help the correlationist. The 
correlationist can speak only of what is given to us, but then the emergence of the correlation 
of thought and being within the cosmos is unthinkable. As he writes:  
“An ancestral statement only has sense if its literal sense is also its ultimate sense. If 
one divides the senses of the statement, if one invents for it a deeper sense conforming 
to the correlation but contrary to its realist sense, then far from deepening its sense, one 
has simply cancelled it. This is what we shall express in terms of the ancestral 
statement’s irremediable realism: either this statement has a realist sense, and only a 
realist sense, or it has no sense at all.”30  
Thus correlationists cannot reconcile the indisputable ancestral statements of science with their 
correlationism. So the position allegedly fails. It is not really clear though how his argument is 
supposed to work exactly. He is certainly not only saying that science is right and correlationism 
is wrong. I shall propose a maximally strong version of Meillassoux’s argument. It’s inspired 
by what he writes. But given my earlier remarks on the concept of “correlation”, I shall cast the 
argument in terms of the pair I used in my master thesis, i.e. world-for-us and world-in-itself.  
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Science tells us that there was a time before our existence. The correlationist accepts this claim 
as a claim about how the world is for us. Therefore, the proposition [There was a time at which 
we did not exist] is justified as a claim about the-world-for-us. Now, our human existence is a 
necessary condition for the-world-for-us to be there. Since also this insight is only ‘for us’, the 
proposition [Our existence is a necessary condition for there being the-world-for-us] is again 
only justified as a claim about the-world-for-us. Both propositions logically entail [There was 
a time at which a necessary condition for there being the-world-for-us did not exist]. Since the 
logical laws are justified as claims about the-world-for-us it follows that the proposition [There 
was a time at which a necessary condition for there being the-world-for-us did not exist] is also 
properly justified as a claim about the-world-for-us.  
The latter proposition analytically entails the proposition [There was a time at which the-world-
for-us did not exist] so that [There was a time at which the-world-for-us did not exist] is properly 
justified as a claim about the-world-for-us as well. There are now two options. Either (i) the-
world-for-us is a necessary condition for the existence of time or (ii) time is absolute. 
Suppose that (i) the-world-for-us is a necessary condition for the existence of time. In that case 
the proposition [There was a time at which a necessary condition for the existence of time did 
not exist] is justified as a claim about the-world-for-us. It entails the proposition [There was a 
time at which time did not exist]. Therefore [There was a time at which time did not exist] is 
also justified for us. But this proposition is contradictory and thus actually not justified for us. 
So, correlationists have to reject (i). From this it follows that (ii) time is absolute. Time belongs 
to the in-itself. We have obtained knowledge of the absolute. The correlationist circle is broken 
and correlationism fails. A correlationist may respond that the claim that time is absolute is only 
justified as a human, all to human claim, that is to say, the proposition [Time is part of the-
world-in-itself] is only justified as a claim about the-world-for-us. Thus the circle isn’t broken. 
But this does not help the correlationist. For the correlationist must accept that the proposition 
[We cannot know anything about the-world-in-itself] is justified for-us, which contradicts with 
proposition [Time is part of the-world-in-itself] being also justified for us. So there is no escape 
for the correlationist. Correlationism leads to contradictions for us and must thus be rejected. 
Although the argument from ancestrality is not available in this specific form in Meillassoux’s 
first chapter, I believe it is in fact the most charitable and strongest interpretation of his appeal 
to ancestrality as a serious challenge for and indeed a rebutting argument against correlationism.   
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4. The ancestral argument refuted  
But the correlationist can, I think, refute the argument. The dichotomy between (i) and (ii) is a 
false dilemma. If the-world-for-us is not a necessary condition for the existence of time, that is 
to say, if (i) is false, it doesn’t follow that time belongs to the in-itself, that is, it’s doesn’t follow 
that (ii) is true. There is a third alternative. For all we know it might be true of the in-itself that 
(iii) there is no time without consciousness and there is a non-human conscious subjective being 
whose subjective world does contain time. Since we cannot rule out this possibility – nor many 
other even more elaborated possibilities – the negation of (i) doesn’t entail (ii). Thus a refutation 
of (i) does not result into knowledge of the in-itself. The correlationist circle remains intact. 
An advocate of the ancestral argument might reply that even though the dilemma may be false, 
the correlationist still has no choice but to accept that the proposition [The-world-for-us isn’t a 
necessary condition for time] – being the negation of (i) – and the proposition [We cannot know 
anything about the-world-in-itself] are both justified for us. Since these propositions logically 
contradict each other, correlationism still fails. We escape the prison of the ‘for us’ after all. I’ll 
not go further into this. For below I shall show that the ancestral argument fails regardless. Let 
me therefore assume for the sake of argument that the aforementioned reply is convincing. 
Take the claim that our existence is a necessary condition for the-world-for-us to be there. Call 
this claim C. Is C indeed justified for us? No, it isn’t. Precisely because we don’t know anything 
about the-world-in-itself, it might – for all we know – be the case that the-world-for-us actually 
is human independent reality. In other words, since we don’t know anything about the in itself 
of the-world-for-us, we cannot rule out the possibility that realism is in fact true. But obviously, 
if the-world-for-us is equal to human-independent reality, there being humans is not a necessary 
condition for the-world-for-us to be there. For, clearly, our existence isn’t a necessary condition 
for the existence of human independent reality. Therefore claim C is not justified for us and the 
ancestral argument fails. 
However, this would be too quick. An advocate of the ancestral argument could object that in 
this response the term ‘the-world-for-us’ is taken de re instead of de dicto. The advocate might 
say that on a de re reading of the term ‘the-world-for-us’ our human existence might indeed not 
be a necessary condition for there being the-world-for-us. For realism might be absolutely true 
and in that case the-world-for-us taken de re simply is human independent reality. In order for 
the ancestral argument to really succeed – that is, succeed if we for the sake of argument assume 
that the reply to above’s refutation of the dilemma is cogent – advocates of the argument must 
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opt for a de dicto reading of ‘the-world-for-us’. We must focus on the-world-for-us qua world-
for-us. Without us there is no manifestation of a ‘for us’. Without us there is no givenness of 
being. In this sense human beings are a necessary condition for the existence of the-world-for-
us. Now, on this reading, as the advocates may hold, the ancestral argument succeeds after all. 
Here’s how correlationists can respond. On a de dicto reading of ‘the-world-for-us’ advocates 
of the ancestral argument appear to be “hypostatizing” the-world-for-us. But reifying the-world-
for-us violates correlationism. On correlationism the-world-for-us cannot be substantiated since 
we cannot affirm anything about the in itself of the-world-for-us. For doing so would entail that 
we are affirming something about absolute reality, which on correlationism is epistemically 
wholly unjustified. Correlationists can refute the objection by pointing out that we should never 
engage in reflections on the nature of the-world-for-us. Indeed, the-world-for-us in itself is for 
us terra incognita. This response to the advocate’s objection resembles a correlationist rejoinder 
that Meillassoux himself presents in After Finitude in order to refute it, namely that of conflating 
‘object-level’ and ‘meta-level’. He expresses the correlationist rejoinder as follows:  
“Your objection […] evinces an elementary confusion between the empirical and the 
transcendental level […]. [T]hese two levels of thought – the empirical and the 
transcendental – are like the two faces of a flat sheet of paper: they are absolutely 
inseparable but they never intersect. But your mistake consists precisely in allowing 
them to intersect – you have turned a structure which should have remained flat into a 
Möbius strip.”31  
The point is that talking about the in itself of the-world-for-us comes down to hypostatizing it 
and thus treating it as an object among the objects in the-world-for-us. By doing so, two levels 
of reflection, the-world-for-us and objects within the-world-for-us, are crossed which are never 
to be crossed. There are objects in the-world-for-us and there is the-world-for-us as a condition 
for there being objects for us. This condition, the-world-for-us as manifestation or givenness of 
being, cannot be situated at the same level as objects in the-world-for-us. As he writes:  
“to do so would engender a paradox which, like that of the liar, results from a confusion 
between discourse and its object. […] If you do so, you have simply violated one of the 
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basic requirements for the transcendental – but you have not thereby refuted it, you have 
simply disregarded it.”32 
The main point of this response is that the-world-for-us taken as a set of conditions or forms of 
cognition resides at the meta-level and should thus not be substantiated as an entity at the object- 
level. By conflating these two levels, one ignores the very meaning of the transcendental. At 
the transcendental-level or meta-level there is the-world-for-us which structures or conditions 
our cognition of objects. At the object-level we talk about objects, while still realizing that the 
objects we talk about are given to us relative to our human transcendental forms and conditions.  
Since we cannot know anything about the ontological nature of the-world-in-itself, we cannot 
know anything about the ‘in itself’ of those transcendental forms and conditions, preventing us 
from hypostatizing the-world-for-us. In the same way as correlationists do not absolutize the-
world-for-us – for they are not metaphysical or subjective idealists – they do not ontologize the-
world-for-us as an entity within the-world-for-us. The-world-for-us isn’t a thing at object level. 
The-world-for-us may never be substantiated or reified – neither as ‘the absolute’ as speculative 
idealists do, nor as an entity within “givenness” as advocates of the argument from ancestrality 
do. I take this response to be cogent. So how does Meillassoux aim to refute it? He answers that  
“[t]he core of such a rejoinder consists in immunizing the conditions of knowledge from 
any discourse bearing on the objects of science by arguing that a transcendental 
condition is not an object […]. The notion of condition allows one to ‘de-ontologize’ 
the transcendental by putting it out of reach of any reflection about being.”33  
This is correct, but why would it, given what I’ve said above, be problematic? He claims that 
on correlationism the transcendental level of knowledge must in fact be instantiated at the object 
level – so that the above response renders correlationism contradictory. Since there must be in 
the-world-for-us a subject that instantiates the transcendental level, the above response of the 
correlationist results inevitably in a direct refutation of correlationism. Or so Meillassoux holds.  
However, the rationale he provides for his claim that the transcendental level of knowledge 
must be instantiated within the-world-for-us is untenable. I shall present it and argue that it fails. 
According to Meillassoux the correlationist has no other choice than to concede “that there is a 
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transcendental subject, rather than no subject.”34 Moreover, “there can only be a transcendental 
subject on condition that such a subject takes place.”35 This then implies that the transcendental 
subject “remains indissociable from the notion of a point of view.”36 For, as Meillassoux argues,  
“a subject without any point of view on the world […] would have access to the world 
as a totality, without anything escaping from its instantaneous inspection of objective 
reality. But such a subject would thereby violate the essential finitude of the 
transcendental subject […]. [T]he world for it would no longer be a horizon but rather 
an exhaustively known object […].”37  
This, he points out, would contradict with that subject being a transcendental subject. Hence, 
the transcendental subject “is posited as a point of view on the world, and hence as taking place 
at the heart of the world. The subject is transcendental only insofar as it is positioned in the 
world.”38 Hence “the transcendental subject is localized among the finite objects of its world.”39 
The transcendental subject thus “remains indissociable from its incarnation in a body; in other 
words, it is indissociable from a determinate object in the world.”40 So, a transcendental subject 
of knowledge is always a subject in the-world-for-us, which concludes Meillassoux’s rationale. 
Is his rationale convincing? Does it show that there being instantiated subjects in the-world-for-
us is a necessary condition for “the taking place of the transcendental”? Must a transcendental 
subject be instantiated by a body in the-world-for-us? The only valid answer on correlationism 
is: we just don’t know. The possibility of a transcendental uninstantiated subject cannot be ruled 
out on correlationism, since we do not know anything about the nature of the-world-in-itself. 
Meillassoux’s rationale indeed fails. Clearly, transcendental subjects do have a “point of view” 
on the world. But why would it follow from this that they need to be instantiated between the 
objects in the-world-for-us? That is, why must a transcendental subject be instantiated within 
the-world-for-us in order to have some viewpoint on the world? This doesn’t follow at all. On 
 
34 Ibid., 24. 
35 Ibid., 24. 
36 Ibid., 24. 
37 Ibid., 24. 
38 Ibid., 25. 
39 Ibid., 25. 
40 Ibid., 25. 
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classical theism, regardless of whether it is true or false, God has a point of view on the world. 
But God is clearly not localized as a subject within the world. Should we now conclude that 
classical theism is conceptually incoherent? Of course not, it might be false – but conceptually 
incoherent? That is simply not plausible at all. The rationale for the claim that all transcendental 
subjects are instantiated in the-world-for-us thus fails. But then Meillassoux’s alleged refutation 
of the rejoinder of the correlationist is not successful. The rejoinder is sound. Consequently, the 
argument from ancestrality against correlationism fails. Correlationism still stands unrefuted. 
The circle, the for-us, is not broken. Contrary to what Meillassoux asserts, ancestrality doesn’t 
force us to break with correlationism.41 It’s not “incumbent upon us” to give up correlationism. 
5. The argument from facticity 
Yet, later on in his book he presents another argument against correlationism. It is called the 
argument from facticity. Let me directly quote the crucial passage. In this passage Meillassoux 
addresses the correlationist:  
“When you think of [realism and idealism] as “possible”, how are you able to access 
this possibility? How are you able to think this "possibility of ignorance" which leaves 
[both] eventualities open? The truth is that you are only able to think this possibility of 
ignorance because you have actually thought the absoluteness of this possibility, which 
is to say, its non-correlational character. Let me make myself clear, for this is the crux 
of the matter. So long as you maintain that your scepticism towards all knowledge of 
the absolute is based upon an argument, rather than upon mere belief or opinion, then 
you have to grant that the core of any such argument must be thinkable. But the core of 
your argument is that we can access everything's capacity-not-to-be, or capacity-to-be-
other, our own as well as the world's. But once again, to say that one can think this is to 
say that one can think the absoluteness of the possibility of everything.”42 
Meillassoux’s argument seems to be that the correlationist must concede that he or she presumes 
an absolute, namely the absolute possibility of any proposition about the-world-in-itself. The 
correlationist therefore presupposes an absolute. But this renders correlationism self-refuting, 
since on this view every posited in-itself is inevitably relativized to a for-us.  
 
41 Ibid., 28. 
42 Ibid., 58. 
19 
 
This argument though is untenable. For, indeed, the correlationist thinks the absoluteness of 
both possibilities. After all, the correlationist is thinking about a possibility with respect to the 
in-itself and not with respect to the for-us. But this absolute must be understood correctly. What 
is the correlationist actually saying? For all we know, she says, realism about the in-itself might 
be true. Similarly, as the correlationist has it, for all we know idealism about the in-itself might 
be true. As the 'for all we know' already indicates, both assertions of the correlationist about the 
in-itself are claims about the absence of knowledge of the-world-in-itself. That is to say, the 
correlationist merely affirms that realism and idealism are epistemic possibilities. She is surely 
not affirming that these possibilities are ontological possibilities. For that would entail that she 
knows something about the in-itself, which contradicts correlationism. So the correlationist is 
affirming nothing more than epistemic possibilities of ignorance. She is not saying anything 
affirmative about the ontological nature of the in-itself. No knowledge of the in-itself is claimed 
here, which is entirely consistent with correlationism. Meillassoux has therefore not broken the 
correlationist circle. He didn’t regain access to the absolute. 
When criticizing Meillassoux’s ancestral challenge to correlationism, Peter Hallward points out 
that the problem of the arche-fossil “seems to depend on an equivocation regarding the relation 
of thinking and being, of epistemology and ontology.”43 But the charitable interpretation of the 
argument from ancestrality I propose above doesn’t involve any fatal equivocation. Indeed, it 
is not the first but the second argument against the-world-for-us epistemology that involves a 
problematic equivocation closely related to the one Hallward refers to in his paper. The second 
argument from facticity involves an irreparable and thus fatal equivocation between epistemic 
possibilities grounded in our lack of knowledge of the absolute (i.e., “For all we know, it might 
be the case that X”) and ontological or absolute possibilities regarding being itself (i.e., “There 
is a possible world such that X”). Here’s a simple illustration of the difference between both 
types of modalities. When Jo, who has no knowledge of mathematics at all, enters a class room 
and observes a complex true mathematical formula on the blackboard, it’s from Jo’s point of 
view epistemically possible that the formula is  false. But from this it surely doesn’t follow that 
this true mathematical formula being false is also a real absolute possibility of being itself!  
Meillassoux appears to apply the principle that everything that’s cogently thinkable for us is 
also absolutely possible with respect to the in-itself. But why then would this be the case? Why 
would what is merely thinkable for us also be a real absolute possibility of the absolute? This 
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doesn’t follow. His principle is flawed. Correlationism implies that we cannot rule out that our 
thought is radically different from the nature of the absolute. It even implies that we cannot rule 
out that thought and being are wholly incommensurable. So correlationists claim nothing about 
the absolute modal nature of the ‘in itself’. That’s why Meillassoux’s second argument fails. 
Let me identify the fatal equivocation in two other expositions of Meillassoux’s argument from 
facticity. Graham Harman provides an helpful explanation of it. I quote the crucial passage: 
“[I]f the correlationist is to avoid becoming a subjective idealist, he cannot allow the 
openness of possibilities to be just one possible option among others. The agnostic 
correlationist’s entire argument hinges on replacing absolute Christianity, atheism, or 
subjective idealism with an absolute openness. And for this reason, he is forced to throw 
in his lot with Meillassoux’s speculative position. After all, the very possibility of 
distinguishing between a for-us and an in-itself at all requires that it be absolutely 
possible that there is more to reality than is currently visible in the correlational circle.”44 
Here the fallacy clearly reveals itself. It’s not required for the correlationist to replace those 
absolute dogmatisms with an absolute, i.e., ontological openness. It’s sufficient to replace them 
with an epistemic openness. Correlationism is an epistemic theory as others agree with.45 It is a 
de-absolutizing epistemology that rejects all knowledge of the absolute. It’s not an ontology of 
the absolute. All that is required for the correlationist is to assert that it is epistemically possible 
that there is more to reality than the invariants of the correlational circle show us. It’s not 
required to affirm this as an absolute or ontological possibility. The circle’s conditions or forms 
might be absolute. Or they might not be. The correlationist simply doesn’t know and thus leaves 
both options epistemically open. By doing so no problem for correlationism arises at all. 
Harman provides yet another rendering of the crucial step in Meillassoux’s argument: 
“Either we emphasize the contingent facticity of the correlate and thereby remove its 
absolute status, or we disavow this contingent facticity in order to turn the correlate itself 
into absolute reality, and thereby become subjective idealists. No middle ground is 
possible. Meillassoux chooses the former path, arriving at his speculative position by 
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simply radicalizing what the correlationists already presuppose – namely, the possibility 
that there might be something in-itself different from what appears to us.”46 
By now the flaw in Meillassoux’s second argument will be clear enough. There are not really 
only two options. The proper dialectic response of the correlationist is to affirm “the possibility 
that there might be something in-itself different from what appears to us” as an epistemic and 
not as an absolute possibility. What’s emphasized is the sole epistemic facticity of the correlate. 
The fatal equivocation in the second argument can also be identified in the exposition of it that 
Meillassoux gave at ‘Speculative Realism: A One-Day Workshop’ in 2007 in London. I’ll focus 
again on the crucial fragments. Says Meillassoux: “If facticity can be conceived, if it is a notion 
that we can effectively conceive – and this must be the case for the correlationist if he wants to 
refute the idealist – then it is a notion we can think as an absolute.”47 Now, the correlationist 
must indeed be able to think facticity as an absolute. But what does that mean? It means that he 
must admit that it is epistemically possible that facticity is absolute. But from this it doesn’t 
follow that he is also committed to the real ontological possibility of facticity being absolute – 
let alone that he would be committed to the claim that facticity is the absolute! These further 
commitments just don’t follow from the mere epistemic possibility of facticity being absolute. 
Thus the second argument does not go through. Here’s an analogy: Eva accepts the epistemic 
possibility of ex nihilo nihil fit being false. Maybe – she concedes – something can come from 
nothing. But granting this doesn’t entail that she also has to affirm that absolute reality is such 
that it is absolutely or ontologically possible for something to come from nothing – let alone 
that she has to affirm that it’s absolutely true that something did actually come from nothing!  
Likewise the equivocation becomes apparent when Meillassoux continues his explanation:  
“What I try to show by this thesis concerns the condition of the thinkability of the 
essential opposition of correlationism: the opposition of the in-itself and the for-us. The 
thesis of correlationism is that I can’t know what the reality would be without me, 
without us, without thinking, without thought. […] But this reasoning supposes that we 
have access to an absolute possibility: the possibility that the in-itself could be different 
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from the for-us. And this absolute possibility is grounded in turn on the absolute facticity 
of the correlation.”48 
The same problem emerges. The correlationist has only access to the epistemic possibility of 
the in-itself being different from the for-us. And since this possibility is only epistemic, for all 
he knows it might not be ontologically possible that the in-itself is different from the for-us. On 
correlationism subjective idealism might be necessarily true. The circle might be the absolute. 
The correlationist doesn’t know and can’t know. As Meillassoux himself concludes his lecture: 
“Maybe, maybe. Correlationism doesn’t say it is impossible, it says it’s unknowable.”49 Since 
on correlationism nothing can be known of the absolute, also nothing can be known of the true 
nature of the correlation. Hence the correlationist’s fundamental notions – for-us and in-itself – 
are not grounded on an implicit absolutization of facticity. For both core concepts are cogently 
conceptualized and grounded from within the circle of correlation. That is, relative to us. It 
seems that Meillassoux thinks otherwise because earlier in his lecture he claims that “describing 
something means not being in it anymore.”50 This thesis could very well have led him to believe 
that “everything can be conceived as contingent, depending on human tropism – everything 
except contingency itself” and “to be is to be factual – and this is not a fact.”51 His thesis though 
is untenable. There are many examples of coherent descriptions from within. Set theory can be 
formally expressed in set theory, data models can be properly modelled by data models, and on 
correlationism the ultimate notions of the in-itself and the for-us can be cogently described from 
within the correlational circle. Indeed, closing a loop does not necessarily lead to theoretical or 
practical contradictions. In any case, given the above exposed equivocation, the argument fails. 
Still, in one of his thorough discussions of After Finitude Graham Harman articulates a related 
challenge for correlationism that even in light of all considerations above requires a response: 
“The strong correlationist […] speaks nonsense. This person says: “I cannot think the 
unthought without turning it into a thought, and yet the unthought might exist anyway.” 
But notice that the final phrase “the unthought might exist anyway” is fruitless for this 
purpose. For we have already heard that to think any unthought turns it into a thought 
 
48 Ibid., 431. 
49 Ibid., 449. 
50 Ibid., 417. 
51 Ibid., 432. 
23 
 
[…]. If you accept the argument that thinking the unthought turns it into a thought, you 
cannot add “but maybe there is something outside [thought]”, because this “something 
outside” is immediately converted into nothing but a thought for us.”52 
The correlationist should not be worried though. On correlationism everything we say can only 
be justified as claim about the-world-for-us. This applies even to the core concepts and claims 
of correlationism itself, such as the claim that we can reasonably ask whether the-world-for-us 
is or is not equal to the-world-in-itself. These and all our other claims are always already claims 
within the context of the-world-for-us. Correlationism is a “loop” that closes without becoming 
contradictory – just as mathematical logic can be expressed consistently in mathematical logic. 
Therefore even the epistemic possibilities reported by the propositions [The unthought might 
exist anyway] and [Maybe there is something outside thought] are only justified for us. Indeed, 
the epistemic possibility expressed by [The-world-in-itself might be different from the-world-
for-us] can only be justified as claim about the-world-for-us. By remaining always in the for us 
we prevent contradictions. But doesn’t correlationism then collapse into subjective idealism?53  
No, it doesn’t. On idealism the proposition [There’s nothing outside thought] is justified for us. 
But on correlationism this proposition – that thought is the absolute – is not justified for us. No 
claim about the nature of the in-itself can be justified as a world-for-us claim. The core argument 
of idealism, that “we cannot think the unthought because to think anything outside thought turns 
it into a thought”54, does not lead to idealism as absolute truth. It doesn’t even lead to idealism 
as an ontological truth for us. It only leads us to the inescapable epistemic prison of the for-us. 
So when correlationists claim that something could exist outside thought for thought, they only 
claim an epistemic possibility for us. The proposition [It’s epistemically possible that something 
exists outside thought] is justified for us, whereas [It’s absolutely possible that something exists 
outside thought] is not justified for us. What can be coherently asserted is that [It’s epistemically 
possible that it is absolutely possible that something exits outside thought] is justified for us. 
Absolute possibilities are unknowable – also in the for us. The modal nature of the absolute is 
inaccessible for us. Even epistemic possibilities are only justified for us. Never can we know 
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that it is absolutely true that something is epistemically possible for us. All our speak, also about 
epistemic and ontological possibilities, is speak ‘for us’. Correlationism so remains consistent.   
    6. The Galilean event 
In his final chapter Meillassoux provides his third and final argument against correlationism. 
This argument departs from what he calls the Galilean event. Galileo discovered that science is 
perfectly capable to mathematize nature. The whole of physical reality, all its structural and 
dynamical aspects, can be mathematically described. It appears that the world is  
“exhaustively mathematizable – the mathematizable no longer designates an aspect of 
the world that is essentially immerged within the non-mathematizable (i.e. a surface or 
trajectory, which is merely the surface or trajectory of a moving body), it now indicates 
a world capable of autonomy – a world wherein bodies as well as their movements can 
be described independently of their sensible qualities, such as flavor, smell, heat, etc.”55  
By doing so science reveals to us for the first time a world independent of “any of those aspects 
that constitute its concreteness for us.”56 The idea seems to be that the world as described by 
science becomes inherently mathematical and thus totally indifferent to precisely those concrete 
secondary qualities that have always linked the physical world for so many centuries to human 
observers. In other words, mathematical science presents us a world entirely separate from us. 
The mathematization of nature exposes a physical reality that is completely independent of 
human existence. It thus uncovers a world that exists in and of itself, that is, a world that is what 
it is whether we exist or not. As Meillassoux asserts: “Modern science uncovers the speculative 
but hypothetical import of every mathematical reformulation of our world. Consequently, […] 
what is mathematizable cannot be reduced to a correlate of thought.”57  
Mathematical science thus unfolds a world independent of any human relation to the world, so 
that correlationism should be given up. Now, this third argument seems not convincing either. 
Human beings are capable both of sense experience and abstract thought. Further, mathematics 
is plausibly a product of human abstract thought. But then anyone who argues that the sensible 
non-mathematical qualities of the world indicate a relation to human beings, must admit that 
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the mathematical qualities of the world do so as well. In other words, if it can be argued that 
sensible concrete qualities link the world to us as human observers, it can be argued as well that 
the world’s mathematically intelligible features link it to humans.  
That the world appears exhaustively mathematizable can in fact be cashed out as an argument 
for the claim that we only have access to the-world-for-us. Let me explain. Mathematics can be 
applied successfully to the world. But why is this so? Why is the physical world so perfectly 
mathematizable? This cries out for some kind of explanation. On realism, there does not seem 
to be a good straightforward explanation (although some philosophers have opted for a theistic 
solution according to which God created physical reality in such a way that it can be properly 
conceptualized by our mathematical concepts). However, on a world-for-us epistemology, the 
almost perfect applicability of mathematics to reality should come as no surprise at all. For, if 
mathematics is just extended rigorous thought, which seems plausible, then it is no wonder that 
the world as it is thought by us, that is to say, the-world-for-us, is mathematically intelligible. 
Indeed, on a ‘for us’-epistemology according to which we can only access the-world-for-us, the 
successful applicability of our mathematical thought is something we would reasonably expect. 
So nature’s almost exhaustive mathematizability does actually increase the epistemic likelihood 
of correlationism over realism. Hence Meillassoux’s third argument doesn’t succeed either. 
But let’s solely for the sake of argument assume that the third argument goes through. Suppose 
that it’s precisely mathematics that unveils to us the true nature of mind independent reality. In 
that case the absolute is inherently mathematical. In After Finitude Meillassoux aims to project 
his principle of unreason into the things themselves. He aims to establish that the ultimate truth 
about reality is that there are no sufficient reasons, no grounds, no causes and no explanations 
for anything. Everything exists or happens for no underlying reason whatsoever. The absolute 
is pure hyperchaos according to Meillassoux. Therefore, mathematics as the proper language to 
describe mind independent reality, must in fact be the proper language to describe hyperchaos. 
But wouldn’t that raise a serious problem for Meillassoux’s realism? For isn't mathematics the 
science par excellence of the conceptual realm of a priori provable and thus necessary truths? 
Mathematical truths seem paradigmatic examples of truths for which there is always a necessary 
reason. So if reality is radically contingent, how then could mathematics be the proper science 
26 
 
to describe it? As Meillassoux conceeds in After Finitude, he has indeed not yet convincingly 
deduced his Cartesian-Badiouian claim that mathematics is the true metaphysics of reality.58 
Peter Hallward points out that in a lecture at Middlesex University in May 2008, entitled Time 
without becoming, Meillassoux comments on his speculative quest to demonstrate convincingly 
that mathematical science is the language of the in itself:    
“Meillassoux admits that he has not worked out a full version of this deduction. [...] In 
a recent lecture, Meillassoux gave a [...] clue to the future development of [it] by 
insisting on the absolutely arbitrary, meaningless and contingent nature of mathematical 
signs qua signs (e.g. signs produced through pure replication or reiteration, indifferent 
to any sort of pattern or 'rhythm'). Perhaps an absolutely arbitrary discourse will be 
adequate to the absolutely contingent nature of things.”59 
He advances the same point in his Berlin lecture.60 So it’s clear that he realizes himself that he 
must face the challenge that the at least prima facie necessity of mathematics conflicts with his 
speculative thesis of the radical contingent or hyperchaotic nature of the absolute. Meillassoux 
must offer some satisfactory account that reconciles both. But is his appeal to the arbitrary signs 
of mathematics as being radically contingent qua signs a promising pathway to a solid argument 
for his claim that the-world-in-itself is inherently mathematical? I shall demonstrate below that 
a far more compelling trajectory is available for Meillassoux to argue that mathematics is indeed 
the most adequate language for describing a contingent reality that lacks reasons for everything. 
It can be found in a short piece I wrote fifteen years ago61 and returns briefly in a lecture I gave 
in 2015 at Wijsgerig Festival Drift in Amsterdam.62 In short, I argue that the conceptual realm 
of mathematics is in fact itself radically contingent. That is to say, the mathematical universe is 
itself a real hyperchaos. All true mathematical propositions – except for an infinitesimal small 
fraction thereof – are true for no reason at all. All except a neglectable number of  mathematical 
truths are true as a matter of brute fact. They are true for no reason whatsoever. Mathematics is 
 
58 Ibid., 111. 
59 Hallward 2011, 135. 
60 Meillassoux 2012. 
61 Rutten 2015. 
62 Rutten 2018, 157-8. 
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thus ruled by what Meillassoux calls the principle of unreason. But then mathematical science 
is indeed an excellent candidate for his metaphysics of the absolute. Let me elaborate the point. 
Kurt Gödel famously showed in the first half of the last century that mathematics isn’t a tightly 
structured formal system of necessary truths. His well-known first incompleteness theorem has 
it that each consistent formal system which includes (Peano) arithmetic is incomplete. That is 
to say, each such system will always contain at least one formula that can neither be proven nor 
disproven. Mathematics as such is incomplete in the sense that no consistent axiom system will 
ever be able to capture all mathematical truths. Regardless of which specific mathematical 
truths are counted as the axiom’s of mathematics, there will always be unprovable mathematical 
truths. It was logician and mathematician Gregory Chaitin who increased the impact of Gödel’s 
first theorem tremendously by showing that unprovable truths in mathematics are anything but 
rare or obscure. They are everywhere. The realm of mathematical truths is radically incomplete 
and hence radically contingent. Each true mathematical formula encodes a quantifiable amount 
of informational complexity – and true mathematical formulas whose complexity is larger than 
the complexity encoded in the mathematical axiom’s are unprovable, as Chaitin convincingly 
demonstrated.63 They are true without any reason. Their truth is a brute inexplicable fact. There 
is some complexity threshold, namely the complexity associated with the axioms, such that any 
true formula whose complexity exceeds it is wholly unprovable. It thus follows that there are 
essentially just a few provable mathematical truths surrounded by an endless infinite sea of 
unprovable mathematical truths. The mathematical universe resembles an infinitesimally small 
island of provable truths in the midst of an infinite ocean of brute contingent truths. So beyond 
this infinitesimally small island of provable truths, all mathematical truths are just arbitrarily or 
randomly true or false – that is to say – true or false without any reason or explanation at all. 
Except for a few provable truths on a negligibly small island, all mathematical truths are merely 
contingently true. It’s exactly this radical contingency of the mathematical realm that resembles 
the essence of the-world-in-itself on Meillassoux’s speculative realism. For according to him 
the absolute is hyperchaos. But then it should come as no surprise that mathematics can be taken 
to be the language of the absolute. Chaitin’s results thus reveal the true language of the in itself. 
So, given that almost all mathematical truths are true for no reason al all, mathematics does 
indeed seem to be the proper science to describe reality as being a contingent hyperchaos. Here 
we appear to have the trajectory Meillassoux is looking for, i.e. a compelling rationale for his 
 
63 Chaitin 2002, 2006. 
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conjecture that mathematics, and mathematics alone, is the language of the absolute. The above 
line of reasoning seems to me the most promising pathway available to argue that mathematics 
reflects the absolute. But again, only if we for the sake of argument and wholly contrary to what 
I’ve shown, assume that the circle of correlation has been successfully broken by Meillassoux. 
7. Closing Remarks 
In this article I presented and refuted three arguments put forward by Meillassoux in his much 
discussed book After Finitude against the epistemic position he has coined correlationism. His 
three original arguments, that is, the argument from ancestrality, the argument from facticity, 
and the argument from the almost perfect mathematization of nature are interesting and thought 
provoking. Nevertheless, given that these best in class arguments do not succeed, correlationism 
stands unrefuted. The “codicil of modernity” is therefore still with us. Now, until and unless 
other more convincing objections are proposed by realists, the ‘for us’ remains inescapable. 
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